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Abstract This article offers a narrative of the Spanish crisis building upon previous lit-
erature and the papers published in this issue.This narrative focuses on twomain topics:
(1) the reasons why the Spanish economy embarked in the expansionary/speculative
path resulting in an over-accumulation of debt and severe macroeconomic imbalances
that led to the crisis, and (2) the factors that explain why the Spanish crisis materialized
with such a high intensity and duration. The article addresses them by highlighting
three main characteristics of the Spanish economy in the pre-crisis period: (1) a com-
position of economic activity increasingly biased towards construction, real state, and
other non-tradeable sectors, (2) a banking system that was able to satisfy the huge
increase in credit demand arising from households and firms, in a context of very low
real interest rates, excessive optimism about growth, and large facilities for using real
assets as loan collateral, and (3) the recourse to external funding that originated an
unprecedented increase in liabilities with respect to the rest of the world.
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1 Introduction
The story of the recent economic crisis in Spain has been told many times and in many
different versions. Yet, as time goes by, economic research is showing new elements
of its nature and its protractedness. Thus, the editors of SERIEs decided to devote
a monographic issue to the analysis of different aspects of the impact of the great
recession on the Spanish economy. As guest editors, we had the opportunity to look
closely at a new vintage of papers on the performance of the Spanish economy during
the last years. In this introductory article we offer our narrative of the crisis, which is,
in part, based upon our readings of these papers and of the relevant previous literature,
and, in part, on informed conjectures about the main cyclical factors and long-run
trends that conditioned such a performance.
The Spanish variety of the so-called great recession is indeed a multi-faceted crisis,
with the financial system, the public sector, households, and the corporate sector all
together at the forefront of its origin and involved in its evolving process. Some of
the main developments that eventually led to the crisis are well-known and have been
analyzed elsewhere [see, for instance, Estrada et al. (2009), the set of papers collected
in FEDEA (2010), Suárez (2010) andOrtega and Peñalosa (2012)]. However, there are
still two essential elements that, in our view, are less well understood. The first one has
to dowith the factors that made the Spanish economy especially prone to embark in the
expansionary/speculative path resulting in an over-accumulation of debt and severe
macroeconomic imbalances that led eventually to a crisis. The second is about the
factors that explain why the crisis materialized with intensity and some characteristics
different to the consequences of the great recession in other countries, including the
role that economic policies may have played at generating these peculiarities.
To answer these questions, it is important to understand three main characteristics
of the Spanish economy during the pre-crisis period:
1. A composition of economic activity increasingly biased towards construction, real
state, and other non-tradeable sectors. To a large extent, this bias was the result
of (1) a labor market regulation that strongly favors the creation of temporary and
seasonal jobs, (2) a housing market that, after its liberalization in the early 2000s,
providedwide scope for demandand supply to expand significantly, and (3) product
and labor markets that, being poorly regulated, do not promote the creation and
growthof newfirms in the tradeable sector.All these together eventually conformed
a “dual economy”, with some large firms highly productive and competitive in
international markets, and a large number of small and medium sized firms with
low productivity and low growth potential.
2. A banking system capable of satisfying the huge increase in credit demand from
households and firms, in a context of very low real interest rates, excessive opti-
mism about growth, and lax facilities for using real assets as loan collateral, thus
creating the landscape for financial instability when these real assets lost value.
3. The recourse to external funding to sustain the rise of credit that led to an unprece-
dented increase in liabilities with respect to the rest of the world, and the lack of
anticipation by policy-makers, both with national and international responsibili-
ties, of the consequences of excessive accumulation of external debt.
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Accordingly, we organize the paper in three main sections, one per each of the factors
to be stressed: the weakness of the growth model underlying the performance of the
Spanish economy in the pre-crisis period, the consequences of the banking intermedi-
ation in a speculative bubble, and the implications of the external disequilibrium. We
conclude with some remarks about what has been achieved so far in the correction of
these phenomena and what remains to be done.
2 The “fundamentals”: product and labor markets, and the growth model
When financial markets started to show some signs of distress in August 2007, the con-
ventional view was that the Spanish economy had “solid fundamentals” and, despite
the high debt and the imbalances accumulated during the pre-crisis period, it was
resilient enough to the international financial shocks that back then were thought to
be the sources of the economic slowdown. This confidence was however built on fac-
tors that eventually resulted to be either inexistent or insufficient: (1) a fiscal surplus
and low public debt that would supposedly provide wide scope for countercyclical
demand policies; (2) reasonably flexible product and labor markets that would allow
to gradually and smoothly unwind the excesses of the past and other macroeconomic
imbalances, and (3) a banking system with large capital buffers and supposedly pro-
tected of the US subprime crisis that originated the early financial turmoil (to be
discussed in Sect. 3). This conventional view, shared by many economic commenta-
tors, the Spanish Government of the times, and some international organizations, was
based on the traditional paradigm under which exogenous shocks are at the origin of
economic fluctuations, on the confidence in countercyclical demand policies to smooth
slowdowns in economic activity, and on the belief that the Spanish labor and product
markets, after a sequence of reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s and the large influx
of immigrants, were flexible enough to accommodate a recession without significant
losses in production capabilities.
An alternative view was skeptical both about the benign interpretation of the impli-
cations of the financial crisis, and about the supposedly strong fundamentals of the
Spanish economy. This view stressed that the Spanish economy was very dependent
on external financing and, therefore, very likely to suffer a sudden stop as soon as
the favorable international financial conditions worsened, that the very high levels
of private debt were only sustainable with unending increases in housing prices and
higher productivity growth, and that reforms of the product and labor reforms, together
with the easy access to credit, had created a allocation of resources very much biased
towards non-tradeables, and, specially, towards the construction and the real estate
sectors. Other sources of concern were that macro policies (monetary and fiscal) were
deemed to have been not sufficiently countercyclical during the expansion, so that
during the crisis they were bound to be constrained, that changes of the regulation
of product and labor markets were not properly evaluated and, that, after the initial
signs of an economic slowdown, neither macro nor micro polices seemed to react with
promptness and guided by a correct diagnostic of the situation. In fact, the expan-
sionary fiscal response in 2008–2009 was misguided and very counterproductive, as it
exhausted any scope for expansionary fiscal policies when they were eventually more
needed.
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As a result, some observers perceived that the correction of the external imbalances
was bound to be very difficult and potentially abrupt, especially given the gloomy
growth forecasts and the inability to appeal to exchange-rate devaluations as an adjust-
ment mechanism. In sum then, the Spanish economy was about to suffer, not a mild
slowdown somehowsmoothed out by demandpolicies, but a long andprotracted period
of adjustment punctuated by periods of severe financial distress. Indeed, under this
view, since the problem was the unsustainable financial position of the private sector,
the adjustment was unavoidable, and would have taken place even without the US sub-
prime crisis or some other developments affecting negatively to the global economy.
Nowadays, these two alternative views of the crisis still receive much attention.
Caruana (2014) has labeled them the “shortfall of demand view” and the “balance
sheet view”, and, after considering evidence and deriving the policy prescriptions
that would follow from each one of these two views, concludes that the latter seems
to provide a better explanation of the crisis overall, although, in his opinion, “the
diagnosis has to be country-specific” (sic).
Thus, turning more deeply into the Spanish case, in this Section we lay out a first
component of the answers to two questions: (1) What made the Spanish economy so
prone to suffer the speculative boom of the 1995–2007? and (2) Where were the main
sources of that speculative boom?
2.1 Labor market institutions and the composition of production
During the pre-crisis period the Spanish economy developed some characteristics that
made it especially prone for a housing bubble. The twomost relevant oneswere a bank-
ing sector that was capable of capturing external funding to transform it into mortgage
credit; and a construction sector, which after the large infrastructure investments of
the 1980s and 1990s, supported partially by European structural funds, had enough
capacity to expand and deliver an increasing influx of new houses and infrastruc-
ture works. Demographics trends—immigration and emancipation of the late baby
boomers—provided a further boost to housing demand, which was expanded by a very
favorable tax treatment of house ownership, and by the traditional way of financing
self-employment and small businesses through the use of real assets as loan collateral.
Ironically, these two strengths nurtured a housing bubble, and once the process started,
it gained momentum, sustained by strong feed-back effects. For instance, changes in
banking and land regulations provided further impulse to the speculative housing
boom. These changes were not always in anticipation of the negative consequences
of the speculative process, which, as shown by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013)
and Santos (2014), provided incentives for the generation of financial assets of not
very good quality, complicated monitoring and policy evaluation, and facilitated the
entrenchment of interest groups and lead to a deterioration of governance institutions.
Some of these negative political economy effects were notoriously felt in the poor
regulation of the labor market. By allowing for temporary and fixed-term contracts
under, de facto, a wide array of conditions, this regulation favored seasonal activities
and the creation of short-duration jobs, very prevalent in the construction sector, but a
the cost of promoting very inefficient job turnover in the rest of the sectors. In general,
labor market regulations are the result of a political process in which both efficiency
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and equity considerations are taken into account (Bertola 2014). However, it happens
very often that these regulations are tailored out to fit the peculiarities of the economic
structure of a given country, for instance, with a dual employment protection legis-
lation (allowing for fixed-term, temporary contracts, besides the regular, open-ended
employment contract) to lower the hiring and firing costs of sectors with presumably
high job turnover (tourism, construction, etc.) This strategy fails to realize that, by
doing so, jobs, in that sector but also elsewhere, will be predominantly created under
the schemes most favored by the legislation (fixed-term, temporary contracts). There-
fore, and as basic economic textbooks show, what a country produces and how does
it, are determined not only by endowments of physical and human capital relative to
the rest of the world, but also by labor and product market regulations.
Hence, the sectoral composition of production is not an exogenously given con-
straint that produces a particular mix of employment contracts. It is the availability
of temporary employment contracts (among other factors) what influences the sec-
toral and occupational composition of employment, how many jobs are created and
destroyed, and, last but not least, which socio-demographic groups are more likely to
be hired and fired.
Another particularly important consequence of product and labor markets regula-
tion was to be felt in productivity developments. Since the early 1980s the Spanish
economy enjoyed a huge increase of physical and human capital. However, during the
period 1995–2007 labor productivity and TFP growth rates were, in annual averages,
0.7 and 0.0%, respectively. This was also the period in which the unemployment rate
came down from almost 20% in 1994 to around 8% in 2007. At those times, many
commentators and international organizations praised the liberalization of the Spanish
labor market, for paving the way for high employment growth and causing the huge
reduction in unemployment. But others (see, for instance, Bentolila and Jimeno 2006)
remained unconvinced about the advantages of increasing flexibility a the labor mar-
ket by creating a dual structure with a high prevalence of fixed-term contracts, while
at the same time maintaining a wage setting system that protected insiders with real
wage rigidities, and expressed concerns about the sustainability of low unemployment
rates once the extraordinary macroeconomic conditions of the times changed. There
were also concerns about how the Spanish labor market was reacting to long trends
in the world economy, such as skill-biased technological progress, globalization, and
increasing migration.
The paper byAnghel et al. (2014) on employment polarization is especially relevant
in this regard. It focuses on changes in the occupational employment shares, highlight-
ing how during the period 1997–2012 several socio-demographic groups adapted to
those changes. As it has also been shown in other countries, they find a decline in the
share of occupations involved in routine tasks, and a rise of those with non-routine
service contents, both at the low and the high tails of the wage distribution, while jobs
with a higher degree of abstract contents do not appear to increase their share in total
employment during these 15years. Four other findings areworth highlighting: (1) these
developments are not only the consequence of the sectoral reallocation of employment,
associated to the increasing weights of the construction and non-tradeables sectors,
since they took place within almost all the industrial sectors, (2) this trend accelerated
during the great recession, (3) affected males and young workers more strongly than to
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females and old workers, because of higher concentration of the latter in occupations
more focused on routine tasks, and (4) changes in the composition of labor supply by
educational attainments cannot explain the increase in the share of occupations at the
low end of the wage distribution. Although employment polarization of this type is
typically thought to be associated to skill-biased technological progress (seeAutor and
Dorn 2013), Anghel, de la Rica and Lacuesta show that the response of the Spanish
labor market to this phenomenon displays important peculiarities that seem consistent
with a segmented labor market offering low opportunities to stable, high value added
jobs, and displaying inefficient job turnover.
2.2 Wage and employment dynamics
The institutional configuration of the Spanish labor market did not only contribute
to the housing bubble and the concentration of resources into non-tradeables. It also
explains wage and employment dynamics during the crisis, with wages initially dis-
playing a strong downwards rigidity, and a large share of employment losses coming
from employees under fixed-term contracts.
Two of the papers in this issue focus on wage determination in the Spanish labor
market. First, De la Roca (2014) uses longitudinal data from the Social Security reg-
isters to gauge the degree of cyclicality of real wages in Spain throughout the period
1988–2011. He does so by, first, estimating the net present value of wages in new
matches to show that it is well approximated by the cyclicality of wages for newly
hired workers, more than 95% of them under fixed-term/temporary contracts. Sec-
ondly, he highlights that this margin of wage adjustment is the main one under the
Spanish wage determination system, given the constraints imposed by collective bar-
gaining legislation. Finally, despite that margin of flexibility and the finding that the
response of wages of workers under temporary contracts is twice as large for work-
ers under permanent contracts, de la Roca estimates that the response of wages to a
1% decline in the (lagged) unemployment rate is about 0.4%, which is the lowest
among available estimates for other developed countries (between 1.3 and 1.5% in
the US and between 2.0–2.2% in European countries). Thus, as expected, institutions
that make difficult for firms to respond to business cycle fluctuations deliver a much
higher degree of wage rigidity, and it is wage rigidity, together with the prevalence of
temporary contracts, what explains the huge employment losses registered in the Span-
ish economy during 2007–2009, in contrast with the small changes in employment
in other countries where labor market regulations were more conducive to changes in
working hours, labor hoarding, and wage adjustments (see Casado et al. 2014).
The second paper on wage and employment dynamics is by Sala and Trivin (2014).
They study why employment fluctuations in the Spanish labor market are so volatile,
by applying (Blanchard and Katz 1992) methodology to estimate how unemployment,
participation, migration flows, and prices react to regional employment shocks. They
confirm previous results in this literature (see, for instance, Bentolila and Jimeno
1998): changes in participation rates are themain adjustmentmechanism in expansion,
while unemployment and labor mobility are more important during recessions, with
migration flows being larger in high-unemployment regions. The estimation of the
differential importance of the three variables during expansions and recessions, the
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consideration of the response of prices to labor demand shocks, and the additional
disaggregation by two groups of regions (one including Catalonia, Madrid, Navarra,
and the Basque Country, and the other one grouping the rest of the regions) are the
main contributions of the paper. Regarding prices, the main finding is, once more,
that strong real wage rigidities, arising from the determination of nominal wages and
consumer prices, are present both in expansions and in recessions.
3 The banking sector
As mentioned we are interested in understanding what made Spain particularly prone
to speculative cycles. An important factor in this regard is the existence of a large and
competitive banking sector, ready to intermediate and direct the enormous amount of
funds that were needed to finance the boom in consumption and investment taking
place in Spain during the first decade of the euro.
The Spanish banking system in the eve of the euro had witnessed a remarkable
transformation for over a decade. First, it experienced a remarkable process of con-
solidation during the years that followed accession to the European institutions. In
addition some of the resulting entities became, through a bold acquisition strategy,
global banks, so that Spain had financial institutions with balance sheets that were
large when compared to the size of the Spanish economy. Second, legal changes in
the second half of the 1980s had made the Cajas, the Spanish equivalents of savings
and loans, into a new dynamic player in the Spanish credit market, by converting them
into banks in all respects but name, with one very crucial exception: their governance
structure. They were private entities without the governance structure one typically
associates with private firms: a shareholder structure with both economic and political
rights that is represented in a board empowered tomonitor and disciplinemanagement.
Instead legal changes enshrined the principle of local political representation, so that
both municipal and regional authorities became amply represented in the governance
bodies of the Cajas. In addition regional authorities had broad powers to alter the legal
framework under which they operated. Predictably, the result was the capture of these
institutions by the local political elites (Santos (2014), offers a thorough account of
these developments). This had consequences for both the evolution of the real estate
bubble as well as for the management of the crisis.
In sum, by the mid nineties, in the eve of the monetary union, the Spanish banking
sector had turned the corner on a second banking crisis, was well in a process of
consolidation, and featured a new dynamic player in the Cajas. In addition the Bank
of Spain had retooled itself and gained considerable experience in the handling of
systemic banking crises after having coped with two in the span of barely 20years. It
had as well introduced several innovations, such as the dynamic provisioning system,
that ledmany observers to think that the banking systemhad enough safeguards against
any imbalances building in the economy.
But the imbalance, the real estate and construction boom that Spain experienced
between the late 1990s and 2007, was larger than envisaged. The exposure of Spanish
banks and Cajas to the real estate sector increased considerably during this period.
Figure 1 shows the real estate exposure, defined as the sum of mortgage loans and
loans for housing renovations, loans to real estate developers and loans to construction
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Fig. 1 Real estate risk in the portfolios. Mortgages and loans for housing renovation (Credit institutions:
BE041304; Banks: BE041404; Cajas: BE041504), loans to construction companies and real estate devel-
opers as a percentage of loans to households and firms (Credit Institutions: BE041301; Banks: BE041401;
Cajas: BE041501). Quarterly. 1992Q4–2010Q2. Data source: Bank of Spain
companies, for the banks,Cajas, and the credit institutions overall. It went from 32.7%
in 1992Q4 to 62% of the loan portfolio to firms and households in the eve of the
crisis. The Cajas had considerably more exposure than the banks, and at the peak
real estate loans comprised 70% of the entire loan portfolio. This estimate is likely
to underestimate the extent of the exposure of financial institutions to the real estate
sector as it does not include items such as equity stakes banks and Cajas had in real
estate developer and construction companies, as well as loans to hotels, which are
likely to be closely linked to the situation in the real estate sector. Thus, the sensitivity
of the asset side of the balance sheet to a housing price correction was enormous.
Given the size in GDP terms of the accumulation of real estate risks in the balance
sheet of credit institutions, the potential risks were systemic. At the peak the mortgage
portfolio was above e600bn or slightly below 60% of Spain’s annual GDP in 2007.
And, moreover, real estate bubbles are typically associated with loosening of the
lending standards. For instance Keys et al. (2013) document that the real estate bubble
in the US was accompanied by a strong increase in no-documentation subprime loans,
mortgages with an incomplete set of documents. Prior to 2000, fewer than 20% of new
subprime loans were originated with low or no documentation. By 2006, as lenders
became to rely increasingly in noisy FICO scores and LTVs as sufficient statistics
for the quality of the borrower, this figure approached a full 50% of new subprime
originations. In addition these authors note that there is substantial empirical evidence
that the liquidity of the loan, i.e. the ability to securitize the loan and pass through the
risk to third parties, decreases the incentives to screen borrowers.
The paper by Akin et al. (2014), argues that the mechanism at work in Spain was
rather different due to the fact that the securitization was less of factor in the Spanish
case. They identify the precise channels that link the credit and real estate boom and
the deterioration of lending standards throughout this period, and show the presence
123
SERIEs (2014) 5:125–141 133
of a rather different mechanism than the one at work in the US. They have access to
a data set that allows them to observe unique characteristics of both borrowers and
lenders as well as appraisal values and, for a subset of the sample, market prices. The
results illuminate some interesting patterns concerning lending standards during the
boom and bust periods. For instance workers with temporal contracts received during
the boom mortgages with LTVs that were economically and statistically identical to
the mortgages received by permanent workers, though the former were more exposed
than the latter to the inevitable adjustment in the real estate sector and thus more
likely to be unemployed. In addition, during the real estate boom employed and non
employed borrowers paid the same loan spreads. All these effects get undone during
the bust. They conclude that the lending standards during the boom were excessively
soft.
In addition the nature of their dataset allows them to explore the differences in
lending behavior between banks and Cajas. They find that credit institutions that
were rescued at some point or another of the crisis by the Spanish authorities, all of
them Cajas, granted mortgages with the highest LTVs. An important contribution of
their work is to show evidence on how banks and Cajas circumvented restrictions
on LTVs that were put in place precisely to avoid the excessive risk taking behavior
during the real estate boom. Unlike the US where agency issues related with the
securitization standards are behind the loosening of the lending standards, in Spain
appraisal companies were encouraged by their owners (the banks and Cajas), which
were also their clients, to inflate their estimates of value and thus reduce the LTVs to
facilitate compliance with Bank of Spain standards.
An important question is whether the accumulation of real estate risks in the balance
sheet of the Spanish banks and Cajas led to constraints in lending during the bust.
This is a key policy question as the cost of an speculative credit cycle is not only the
misallocation of capital during the boom, but also the likely credit crunch that follows
when the bust comes as the banks try to replenish their capital buffers. Hernando and
Villanueva (2014) explore this channel and find that lagged exposure to real estate (and
the interaction with housing prices) is a good predictor of financial institutions’ capital
growth once housing prices had accumulated two years of negative growth. The lag
in the effect is an interesting finding and speaks to the issue of the effectiveness of
dynamic loan provisioning in Spain. As they note, it may be likely that initial housing
price drops were absorbed by existing provisions and thus capital growth did not react
to the losses at the beginning of the recession, though the NPL ratio was growing
steadily.
In addition they find that lagged exposure to real estate only predicts NPL growth
in the real estate sector. This suggests that credit institutions exposed to real state
were not lending to worse quality firms: The drop in mortgage lending standards
identified by Akin et al. (2014) does not seem to extend to firms outside the real estate
sector. Another important consideration is about the connections between the credit
and capital growth. Hernando and Villanueva (2014) find though that this channel can
only explain a small fraction of the credit collapse, which suggests that demand factors
are also to blame for the large drop in credit activity.
The counterpart to the mortgages and loans in the banks balance sheets are of
course the liabilities of households and firms. There are important welfare conse-
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quences associated with household debt; in particular, low income households may
face severe pressure to meet commitments in an environment with high unemploy-
ment and low income growth. In the case of firms, debt overhang may have important
negative consequences for investment and thus employment creation. Bankruptcy is
of course an important deleveraging mechanism. The paper by García-Posada and
Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) is concerned with the efficiency of Spain’s bankruptcy law.
Their starting observation is that businesses in Spain rarely file for bankruptcy. The
reason is that, as it is well known, the size distribution of firms in Spain is biased
towards smaller ones, which have very low filing rates when compared to larger firms.
The reason, these authors argue, is that Spain’s bankruptcy code entails significant
fixed costs, for both firms and creditors, which of course hurt smaller firms propor-
tionally more. García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) show that Spanish small
firms react to these larger costs by raising finance through mortgage loans, which in
case of adverse business performance leads to foreclosure and asset repossession.
The question of the optimality of the bankruptcy code is key, in particular for a coun-
try in a monetary union, where the possibility of nominal adjustment is essentially pre-
cluded. Indeed, institutional flexibility and rapid adjustment of balance sheets seems
a precondition in a monetary union with limited transfers amongst member nations.
An important feature of the paper by García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) is
that it emphasizes the need to deepen our understanding of the ex-ante consequences
in terms of the capital structure of poorly designed institutions and the ex-post costs
of slow adjustment in the case of debt overhang.
These studies provide a window onto the nature of the asset quality problems
accumulating in the Spanish banking system, but there were fragilities as well in the
liability side of the balance sheets, in particular some that were a new feature in this
banking crisis when compared with the two previous one Spain had experienced since
the mid 1970s. Specifically, throughout this period retail deposits funded a decreasing
fraction of the loan portfolio and this, of course, increased the fragility of the Spanish
banking system. Two are the reasons for this increased fragility. First much of whole
sale funding is short term and reacts quickly to whatever concerns there are on the
quality of the issuer; instead retail deposits are notoriously sticky and slow to react, safe
under the deposit insurance umbrella. Second, much of this funding was supplied by
foreigners. Indeed as the next section shows a remarkable feature of the Spanish crisis
is that it had characteristics that were strikingly similar to those of foreign currency
crises experienced by some developing economies over the last three decades. In
particular, the dramatic events of 2011 and 2012 were reminiscent of the sudden
stops experienced by countries with large external liabilities denominated in foreign
currencies. The performance of Spain’s external sector during the early years of the
euro is a critical ingredient to understand the dynamics of the crisis.
4 The foreign sector
One of the most striking aspects of the pre-crisis period was the buildup of strong
external imbalances in the current accounts ofmany countries. Some, such asGermany,
developed current account surpluses whereas others, such as Greece, Portugal and
Spain, experienced strong deficits. For instance Spain reached a current account deficit
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of 10% of GDP in 2007. These large and sustained deficits translated into strong
external liabilities over time.
There are two ways to interpret these external imbalances. First, deficits can be
seen as the result of a strong expansion of internal demand that, in the Spanish case,
came from consumption and investment: the enormous growth in real estate activities,
and other investment, as well as domestic consumption were well above domestic
savings and thus the large current account deficits. The starting point of this analysis
is that international capital flows are determined by the cross sectional dispersion in
the marginal productivity of capital and, also, the need to smooth out business cycle
shocks. Hence, the main determinants of the foreign position are developments in the
real side of the economy.
A second view focuses instead on the autonomous factors driving international
capital flows that are not merely those implied by changes in the real economy. This
view (Bernanke 2005) emphasizes, for example, that international capital flows are
the results of savings gluts in countries such as Germany and China, being recycled
in claims in countries such as Spain and the United States. Under this approach,
international capital flows searching for yield were the main source of speculative
dynamics in the countries recipient of these capital flows, and, hence, banking crises are
connected to the foreign sector developments. Indeed Borio and Disyatat (2011) note
that the since the late 1990s there has been a remarkable growth in gross international
flows (the sum of inflows and outflows), larger than the corresponding current account
positions (net capital flows). Importantly, this growth is driven to a large extent by
an intensification of capital flows among developed nations. All these observations
suggest that it is perhaps more useful to focus on international capital flows, rather
than on traditional drivers of current account dynamics.
It is indeed the case that Spain has been traditionally a country deprived of capital
and thuswith a highmarginal productivity of capital. The reluctanceof investors to hold
assets denominated in pesetas, the old Spanish currency, and the reluctance of Span-
ish counterparties to issue liabilities in foreign currencies limited the size of Spain’s
external imbalances. In addition, whenever Spain’s imbalances grew, devaluations
within the context of the European monetary system, served as the main correction
mechanism.
The monetary union by removing exchange rate risk, allowed for the possibility
of large external imbalances to develop and indeed the size of foreign capital flows
into Spain was unprecedented. Two pieces of evidence on this will serve to make the
point. First the Memoria de Supervisión Bancaria for the years 2003–2007 reports the
volume of the Spanish securitizations in the hands of foreigners. As it is well known
Spanish securitizations came in two types, the standard one in other jurisdictions
which involves transfer of the underlying asset to a special purpose vehicle funded
through the issuance of liabilities with waterfall structures, and a second one akin to a
securitization of a liability, a single-certificate privately placed covered bond (cédulas
hipotecarias). As reported by these Memorias the stock of both types of securitization
was slightly above e300bn by 2007. Of these more than e200bn were in the hands
of foreigners. This evidence is important because it confirms the existence of a direct
link between international capital flows and the real estate bubble.
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Fig. 2 Foreign claims of BIS reporting banks on counterparties in Spain. In $US billions of dollars.
Quarterly: 2005Q1–2013Q4. Data source: BIS
To gauge the origin of these international capital flows we turn to the BIS statistics.
Figure 2 displays foreign claims of reporting banks on counterparties in Spain, which
is safe to assume are mostly banks. For instance, German reporting banks more than
doubled their claims on Spanish counterparties between 2005 and 2008, from slightly
above $120bn in 2005Q1 to $315bn in 2008Q1, an increase of more than 160% in
3years. As the figure shows this pattern is repeated across the main countries in the
Eurozone as well as some of the main economies outside the euro.
Spain was indeed the recipient of large capital flows from other developed nations
and was soon to found itself with unprecedented liabilities to the rest of the world.
Many disputed the importance of this for after all what is the sense in talking about the
current account deficit that the state of Alabama has with respect to the state of New
York? The difference of course in the “monetary unions” of the USA and the Eurozone
is that the first has a systemof transfers aswell as a populationmobility that aremissing
in the second. Transfers, mostly mechanical in nature in the form of unemployment
insurance, smooth out the adjustment when it comes, and population mobility serves
to alleviate unemployment and the accompanying social problems. Though there is
some population mobility in the form of emigration none of these mechanisms are at
work in Europe to the extent that they are in the US. As a result when the correction
came it would have to be met with real balance sheet adjustment and the limited
fiscal support of national states, creating sovereign crises even in countries considered
models of fiscal probity until then. The most acute phase of the crisis occurred when
the possibility of exchange rate risk was reintroduced, something Eurozone member
nations thought a thing of the past. Once that risk reopened the dynamics of the
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Eurozone crisis were similar to the twin crises model, when countries are afflicted by
both fiscal and balance of payments problems.
Figure 2 also illustrates the striking correction Spain was to suffer once the crisis
hit. For instance German banks lowered their claims on Spanish counterparties precip-
itously, from the aforementioned peak ofe315bn in 2008Q1 toe120bn ine2012Q4,
the peak of the Spanish banking crisis. French banks lowered their exposure from
e203bn to slightly above e100bn in the same period. This is thus a generalized pat-
tern. All countries including those outside the euro lowered their exposure to Spain
dramatically during the crisis. It is not surprising thus that given that many of these
claims were liabilities that needed to refinanced Spanish banks became overly depen-
dent on ECB funding.
Thus, Spain is another example of a global pattern; as Borio and Disyatat (2011)
emphasize global current account imbalances (net capital flows) adjusted to a much
lesser extent than gross capital flows. Indeed though Spain’s current account imbal-
ances started closing the moment the crisis hit foreigners redeemed their claims on
Spanish counterparties much faster. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) emphasize that
the relevant accounting identity when considering the external position of a country in
this crisis is CAB+PCI+SMP+PGM+T2 = 0, where CAB stands for the current
account balance, PCI stands for the net private capital inflows, SMP for the securities
market program by which the ECB purchases treasuries of the member nations, PGM
are the official program transfers by the IMF and European mechanisms set for the
purpose of directing official support to program countries and T2 stand for Target
2 positions. For the case of Spain the turnaround of international capital flows were
compensated by an increase in T2 liabilities, which went from a position of no liabili-
ties in 2007 to more than e400bn in August of 2012, the peak of the Spanish banking
crisis. Once the credit line associated with the Memorandum of Understanding was
drawn, the term PGM, a small amount compared to T2, gets activated.
It is indeed the case that Spain’s largest trading partners are all other members
of the Eurozone. Still to assess the performance of Spain’s currency, the euro, Fig. 3
shows the dollar/euro exchange rate since the introduction of the euro in January 1999.
Initially the euro depreciated on account of the economic troubles ailing theEurozone’s
largest economy, Germany. Starting in 2002 though the euro appreciated considerably,
a trend that was to last until the onset of the Great Recession. The appreciation of the
euro forced Germany to a severe wage adjustment to maintain and increase its share
of exports to important partners outside the Eurozone such as the United States, the
United Kingdom and China, increasing its competitive advantage with respect to other
Eurozone economies. In thisGermanybenefitted from labormarket reforms in the early
1990s as well as from the Hartz reforms under Schroeder’s chancellery. By 2007, the
same year that Spain had a current account deficit of 10% of GDP, Germany had a
surplus of 7.5%. Spain had thus the opposite of what is needed when there is strong
accumulation of external liabilities: Its currency appreciated when what needed was
depreciation.
In sum, Spain thus was the recipient of large capital inflows, flows that got reversed
when thebanking crisisworsened.An interestingopenquestion iswhether the presence
of a large, dynamic banking system served to generate large international capital
inflows and to amplify its effects. It is conceivable that these international capital flows
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Fig. 3 Exchange rate: $/e. Monthly: January 1999–June 2014. Data source: Bank of Spain
are supplied elastically towhatever banking system that can provide the safe assets that
this international capital demands, whether be covered bonds or sovereign debt of a
minimum rating. The banking system becomes fragile as a result, in particular if those
inflows fuel a speculative cycle. When the cycle breaks the capital flows get reserved
and what once were safe assets suddenly are found to load on common factors, such
as national real estate prices, to which balance sheet of the lending banking systems
are strongly exposed.
But, was this inevitable? A country can be a large recipient of international capital
inflows but these inflows can immediately be recycled into foreign assets. In this case
net capital inflows are low but gross flows (inflows plus outflows) are very large.
An important issue then is whether in the presence of large inflows policies that
are consistent with free capital movements can be implemented to encourage capital
outflows.
An interesting feature of the dynamics of large capital inflows is that during the
run-up they push upwards estimates of potential GDP growth, which typically don’t
consider external imbalances as an input for their computation. This is important as
the speculative cycle increases the collateral values of the securities backing up the
claims issued by the banking system, which in turn fuels additional inflows, rein-
forcing the cycle. It follows that estimates of potential GDP should take into account
external imbalances because these contain information regarding the sustainability of
the expansion.
The paper by Alberola et al. (2014) deals precisely with the estimation of poten-
tial GDP when external imbalances are present. Specifically these authors argue that
standards estimates of potential GDP growth rely exclusively on inflation as an indi-
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cator. Indeed prior to 2001 there was a strong positive correlation between growth and
inflation, but not afterwards. It is for this reasons that estimates of potential growth
were pushed upwards and perhaps led many foreign investors to keep directing funds
to countries such as Spain. Alberola et al. (2014) first distinguish between standard
measures of potential GDP growth and sustainable GDP growth, which is the max-
imum rate of growth that can be obtained without widening of imbalances such as
current account imbalances. Building on this distinction they propose a new method-
ology to estimate sustainable growth rates, one that incorporates external imbalances
as indicators as well as public and private imbalances. As it is intuitive, they find that
sustainable growth rates during the years leading up to the crisis were below esti-
mates of potential GDP growth, whereas the opposite is true during the crisis. In sum
Alberola et al. (2014) propose a new measure that should be part of the variables to
monitor when conducting stabilization policies, and, additionally, they can serve as
early warning indicators of brewing crises.
The external sector thus is a key ingredient in the Spanish experience during the bub-
ble years, one that deserves further study. Given the lack of monetary policy autonomy
it seems that additional tools are needed to first monitor international capital flows,
and, second, to guarantee that they do not translate into banking and financial insta-
bility. It is likely that new macroprudential tools may make it too costly for banks to
intermediate these flows but alternative entities, such as asset managers or large non
financial corporate, may serve as intermediation vehicles in future episodes. A world
dominated by open international capital markets and a search for yield is one where
the economic consequences of large capital flows are likely to remain important for
the foreseeable future.
5 Concluding remarks
The image that comes across of the Spanish crisis, which is still ongoing, is that of a
perfect storm: large international capital inflows were captured by a dynamic Spanish
banking sector thatwas able to issue (apparently) safe assets thatwere backed explicitly
and implicitly by a booming real estate sector. Two factors combined to produce the
real estate boom needed to generate the assets and liabilities in the banks’ balance
sheets: (1) the presence in Spain of large civil engineering companies that could
undertake the massive construction boom, and (2) a particular labor market structure
that favors temporary employment contracts that first perfectly the strong seasonality
of the construction sector. This complementarity is an important feature of the Spanish
economy, one that needs to change if Spain is to find a different growth model.
This process has left Spain with a massive debt overhang problem: as of 2014Q1
Spain’s net international investment position is a negative trillion euros. This creates a
binding constraint as it is difficult to see how Spain’s traditional growth model based
on expansion of the internal demand, which typically translates into a deteriorating
current account balance, can be operational this time given Spain’s limited capacity to
add liabilities against the rest of the world. Given the obvious challenges associated
with restructuring Spain’s external (and internal) liabilities and the grim prospects of
debt monetization, it seems that the country is heading towards a sustained period of
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current account surpluses through repression of internal demand, while a new growth
model is put in place. Indeed, for the first time in more than three decades Spain had
a positive current account balance in 2013.
It is also difficult to envisage a change in the growth model with the same strategy
followed by structural reforms since the 1990s, and, in particular, during the cri-
sis. Given the need to soften the external funding constraint and the likely continuing
repression of internal demand derived from the long-lasting deleveraging process that,
after accumulating so much debt, the public and private sector will have to undergo,
permanently higher productivity growth in the tradeables sector seems a necessary
condition for the macroeconomic imbalances accumulated during the crisis be gradu-
ally corrected. Typically, sustainable productivity growth is thought to be determined
by the accumulation of capital, technological progress, and well-designed economic
institutions providing the right incentives for agents to put production factors to their
best use and to exploit all the opportunities brought up by technological progress. In
particular human capital accumulation is a critical component and, therefore, improve-
ments in the educational system are key from a long-run perspective. But additionally,
how human capital is used in the labor market depends very much on labor markets
institutions, and, thus, in countries with poor labor legislation, as it is notoriously
the case of Spain, well-designed structural reforms can bring significant permanent
increases in productivity growth even in the short-run. The elimination of the ineffi-
cient job turnover generated by dual employment protection legislation is one of the
most obvious examples, but it is not certainly the only one.
Spain’s economic future seems thus inextricably linked to the evolution of its exter-
nal position and the progress of structural reforms. It remains to be seen whether Spain
can finally adopt a new growth model, one based on strong current account surpluses,
while simultaneously create the employment opportunities that would lead to a reduc-
tion of the unemployment rate. The legacy of the crisis is too intricate and complex to
be easily solved, and sizeable challenges for the Spanish economy remain.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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